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Abstrac t
Compensating victims of occupational diseases poses many problems
such as determining the source(s) of exposure, apportioning financial
responsibility if there are multiple sources, creating incentives to
discover and disclose information as well as incentives to provide a
safe workplace, and providing an equitable level of compensation to
disease victims. A compensation mechanism must work well within the
bounds placed upon it by imperfect information and limited resources.
This paper considers the design of such a mechanism. We pay particular
attention to satisfying both ex ante and ex post criteria of efficiency.
Compensation systems that are ex-ante efficient—thus providing proper
incentives for all economic agents to take efficient actions—cannot
be deemed totally satisfactory when the system has the possibility of
bankrupting itself or when ex post compensations are not correlated
with damages incurred. Thus, ex post considerations must also be
examined. We define these ex post criteria and show how much of the
existing literature has not attempted to address these issues.

I. Introduction
Workers afflicted with occupational injury or disease are compen-
sated for their Losses in a variety of ways. The mechanism that is
most often considered is Workers Compensation insurance which, under
suitable conditions, provides compensation for such losses without
regard to fault on the part of the employer. Workers may also he com-
pensated through the existence of wage differentials related to the
anticipated losses or to the portion of those losses not properly com-
pensated from other sources. In addition, victims of occupational
injury or disease may obtain compensation through the tort system if
the cause of injury or disease is a product whose producer has failed
to provide it in a safe form or with suitable warnings regarding the
dangers involved in its use. Other sources of compensation include
private disability insurance, private health and accident insurance,
and payments under public programs such as Social Security. This paper
discusses the problems associated with structuring a reasonable system
of compensation for occupational disease in a context in which various
sources of compensation exist.
Compensating the victims of occupational diseases poses several
problems in addition to those ordinarily associated with compensating
the victims of other workplace accidents. Quite often, the number of
diseased workers affected is large, the source of exposure to the
1
By occupational disease we mean impairment that does not follow
obviously and immediately from exposure to a work-related source.
When the impairment follows immediately and obviously it will he
called an "accident" or "injury."
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disease is not clear and the manifestation and/or discovery of the
disease is delayed over time. These factors add complexities to the
already complex issues surrounding questions of financial respon-
sibility. The recent publicity given to asbestos-related diseases and
the bankruptcy filing of Manville Corp. have served to heighten public
awareness of some of these problems. Any system of compensation for
victims of these diseases must look toward the joint goals of fair and
efficient compensation on the one hand, and providing the incentives
necessary to maintain a safe work environment on the other. This
paper strives toward establishing such a system.
Any set of rules regarding the responsibility for untoward events
will affect the way in which agents choose to act in pursuit of their
self-interest. If the rules impose all the costs of untoward events
on the users of a product, the manufacturer will have only secondary
reasons for making a safe product whereas the user will have strong
incentives to select safe products and use them sparingly. At the
other extreme, if the manufacturer is deemed responsible for all un-
toward effects, the user wilL have no incentive to select safe prod-
ucts or to use them safely whereas the manufacturer will have direct
incentives to produce safe products. The existence of financing
mechanisms such as insurance and even the way in which such financing
mechanisms are priced also have effects on who bears the cost of
unsafe products and, ultimately, on what level of safety will be
selected.
The selection of safety levels in the workplace is also influenced
by the rules that are developed to allocate financial responsibility.
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If workers were to be required to bear all tbe consequences of un-
toward events, we might expect to find that workers select their
opportunities for employment with great care and exact higher wages
from employers that have records of high frequencies of severe acci-
dents. Employers, for their part, would be acting rationally if they
devoted to safety only as much as is required to offset the effect of
lower labor supply. If, on the other hand, employers are responsible
for all the financial burden of untoward events, they would allocate
to safety as much as is required to just offset the declining cost of
accidents; workers should then be indifferent among employers that use
the same methods of production.
In this paper we attempt to provide a framework for evaluating the
effect of rules on the allocation of financial responsibility on
safety levels in the workplace, paying particular attention to the
problems associated with occupational disease.
IT. Some Limitations of Previous Studies
Many studies have been published on the effects of rules for the
allocation of financial responsibility on the way in which safetv
levels are chosen. " For the most part these studies have related
either to issues of product safety, which is covered under the tort
system, or of workplace in/juries resulting from sudden and clearly
identifiable events in the workplace, which are usually covered by
Workers' Compensation under a system which is basically no-fault.
2
See, for example, Landes and Posner (1984), Danzon (1984) and Oi
(1973).
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Many issues related to occupational disease, however, are quite
different from those related to occupational injuries. Two major fac-
tors account for this difference: (1) Long-term exposure is often
involved in the development of the disease and (2) exposures leading
to the disease might he encountered hoth in the workplace and else-
where. Moreover, these two factors may interact.
As an example, consider the relationship hetween noise and hearing
3impairment. The extent of damage to hearing increases as the level
of sound increases and as the duration of the exposure increases.
Intermittent exposure is less damaging than constant exposure, and
periods of relative silence tend to reduce or limit the amount of
damage. Instances of impaired hearing from exposure to noise will not
occur immediately after exposure. Typical lv it nay taken 10 or 20
vears for impairment to he functional lv significant. This lapse of
time hv itself distinguishes this example from the types of injuries
discussed in the literature. In addition, there is the prohlem that
the worker may expose herself to high sound levels hy frequenting
disco hars or engaging in motorcycle races. Thus the relative
effects of the workplace exposure and the voluntary exposure hecome an
issue. Finally, there is an interaction in that high sound levels on
the joh will cause temporary hearing loss and contrihute to the need
for playing music or conducting conversations at a level of sound
higher than would otherwise he used. The paradigms used in the litera-
ture adapt poorly to such circumstances. Other occupational-disease
3
See Burns and Rohinson (1970).
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exposures, such as asbestos, cotton dust, coal dust, and stress differ
in detail from the example presented above, but retain many of the
features that distinguish it from the models of occupational iniurv.
Effects that occur long after exposure have been discussed in a
number of papers, both in the context of product liability and in that
of workplace safety. Most of the discussion has centered on events
that have a brief duration, such as a sudden release of radioactivity
or of a carcinogenic substance. Though the consequences of these
events may not become apparent for a long time, the timing of the
event and the parties at nlav are both clearly identif iahle . When the
exposure itself is protracted, however, it is not nearly as easy to
identifv the parties at issue, especially if the business line which
causes the exposure is one in which the turnover of labor is high. A
well-known example comes from the mining of radioactive ores in the
post-war period in the United States. The average tenure of a miner
in a given uranium mine is said to have been about four years whereas
the average Lag from exposure to radioactivity to overt cancer is
around 2 5 years. Thus, determining the relative responsibility of the
various employers is no trivial matter. Similar problems are common
in exposure to asbestos. Many of these problems are discussed by
Danzon (1984), Epstein (IPSA) and Viscusi (1984).
These problems stem from a variety of sources. A key one is the
fact that when exposure is cumulative the effects are not necessarily
additive. If we expose a worker to asbestos this year and you expose
a worker to asbestos next year, the health consequences will not be
the same if they happen to be the same worker as they would be if they
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had been different workers. The issue of responsibility is greatly
complicated by non-additivity . Basically we should recognize that,
under these conditions, we are dealing with externalities and that
these effects cannot be addressed from a perspective of property
rights which covers only private goods. The externalities we are
dealing with are, in essence, public harms. It is not our intent in
this paper to create a new system of allocation based on the economics
of public goods; areas in which nonaddi tivity is important will,
however, be duly noted. As a rule, non-additivity creates a need for
identifying the prior exposures of individual workers and using that
information in subsequent decisions. Though there may be strong eco-
nomic incentives to promote rational decision making (given the infor-
mation), there may also be rational objectives that create barriers to
the flow of information. An individual who is at high risk of deve-
loping lung cancer or emphysema because of personal habits (such as
smoking) or individual characteristics (such as genetic anti-trypsin
deficiencv) and has heen exposed to asbestos in one setting may well
object to being barred from working in other environments that create a
health hazard which is, incrementally, very small in the specific
instance but provides the expectation of suhstantial compensation if
the disease were to become manifest.
Another limitation of the existing literature on the subject of
safety incentives is the artificial separation of tort systems and no-
fault systems. While under some conditions it may be worthwhile to
assume that the employer is only an employer, in the case of some of
the gradual exposures that result in injury related to employment
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there is also the possibility that iniury will result from the
employer's role as a producer. The courts already recognize this
"dual-capacity theory" as one way around the Workers' Compensation
laws. Asbestos is a typical example of the coupling between the
employer in the role of employer and the employer as a producer. A
company such as Manville Corp. would have derived no benefit from
exposing workers to asbestos dust in the course of manufacturing
asbestos products if it were not for the fact that asbestos products
were used by others. If the use of the product results in potential
exposure of users, the company may bear financial responsibility for
untoward health effects in both the workplace and the market place.
The financial responsibility for these two types of effect is, under
current practice, subject to different rules. It would be unrealistic
to assume that the company performs separate analyses for setting
safety policy in these two segments and ignores the interactions. Tt
is more reasonable to assume that the company will recognize that some
policies may make sense from one perspective but not from the other.
Thus, if information comes to light on the potential harm of a par-
ticular kind of exposure the company might have every incentive to
disclose the fact and take remedial action to minimize the effect on
current employees and future users, but mi^ht find itself bankrupt if
the tort rules impose on it the financial responsibility under product
liability for all past users of the product. Ignoring the possibility
of such interactions may result in grossly misleading; conclusions.
Another area which is affected bv the assumed relation between
exposure and effect is the ability to collect information and draw
conclusions. In the case of sudden toxic releases of short duration,
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it is conceivable to keep track of the exposed population and measure
the health effects, although there may be a big gap between conceiving
such an activity carrying it out as the recent Union Carbide mishap in
Bhopal points out. In the case of gradual exposure, this activity can
hardLy be entertained seriously unless we anticipate ex ante that there
will be a gradual exposure, that the exposure will be harmful, and that
we know all alternate sources of simultaneous exposures, A meaningful
analysis of the data would also require detailed knowledge of the
alternate sources of exposure among the population under study and of
models that relate the timing and severity of exposure to the resultant
health effects. As an example of the problems that are likely to be
encountered, consider that most of the studies of the health effects of
caffeine are based on information on consumption of coffee and tea and
ignore two major sources of caffeine consumption in the U.S.: cola
beverages and analgesics. Thus, the existence of any reliable infor-
mation is likelv to be a problem. It is, therefore, a mistake to
assume that all effects are known accurately in trying to assess the
relative value of various rules in providing incentives to behave in
ways that we may view as socially acceptable.
Finally, it is a mistake to assume, as much of the existing
literature has done, that we can define unambiguously what constitutes
socially optimal behavior. The structure of the problem is so complex
that the existence of a "best solution" should be proven rather than
assumed, and if there is no best solution, as turns out to be the
case, alternate methods for evaluating rules must be adopted.
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III. Issues in Financing Reparations
Recently, 34 asbestos products and 16 insurance companies signed
the so-called Wellington Agreement. This agreement, named after its
principal designer, Yale Law School Dean Harry Wellington, establishes
a mechanism for handling asbestos-related damage claims. Only one
month after this signing, Manville Corporation, the most well-known
litigant in the asbestos arena and a company which was not a signer
of the Wellington Agreement, announced its establishment of a similar
method for handling asbestos-related claims. Both of these events
underscore the unsatisfactory workings of extant mechanisms in dealing
with asbestos-related damages. This dissatisfaction stems from two
sources. One is the enormous financial burden that can build up
rapidly and unexpectedly in tort cases involving occupational disease.
For example, Drior to the setting-up of these claims mechanisms, the
estimated value of claims against asbestos manufacturers had exceeded
the sum of their financial resources plus the financial resources of
their insurers by more than one billion dollars. The second source
of dissatisfaction is the high transaction cost involved in settling
these claims. Of the one billion dollars spent on asbestos-related
claims from the earlv 1970' s to the end of 1982, some $560 million had
gone to defending the cases, $40 million to litigation among organiza-
tions regarding insurance coverage and liability, $164 million to pav
4
See MacAvoy, Karr and Wilson (1982), who estimate the total net
worth of asbestos producers and insurers involved in the litigation at
$37.1 billion while their estimate of total claims liability (in 1982)
is $38.2 billion.
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for plaintiffs' legal fees, and only $236 million to pay net compen-
sation to the plaintiffs.
Potential Bankruptcy
If existing claims exhaust the ability of the system, either
through limits of insurer liability or through protection of manufac-
turers by bankruptcy laws, there will be no recourse availabLe for
possible later claimants. Exhaustion of the system may create in-
equities that favor those who can settle claims early, while excluding
equally deserving claims that arise too late to make a claim against
the assets of the producers and insurers. The problem of insolvency
appears minor in the case of Workers' Compensation because most states
require the interposition of third-party insurers and make provision
for state guarantee funds. The validity of such guarantees, however,
is largely predicated on the notion that present methods of dealing
with occupational disease will continue to be acceptable. If current
limitations on coverage were lifted by a court decision and the corre-
sponding liabilities were of the order of magnitude of those encoun-
tered in asbestos-related cases, real doubt might arise regarding the
ability and willingness of state funds to cover the resulting finan-
cial obligations.
The most famous particular example is that of Manville Corporation
(formerly Johns-Manvil le) which surprised the financial and legaJ com-
munities on August 26, 1982 with its Chapter 11 filing. It was the
5
See Kakalik, et al. (1983).
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first time that a financially healthy company had turned to the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code to protect itself from future economic ruin. Several
other asbestos manufacturers have also recently filed under Chapter 11,
Manville was profitable at the time of its filing and has gotten even
more profitable since. In the first half of 1985, Manville's net
earnings were $32.6 million on revenues of $993.9 million. However,
the company also faces some $112 billion in liability claims including
some 20,000 claims for asbestos-related diseases worth more than $29
billion; although, some people contend that Manville may have exag-
gerated its future liabilities to help its Chapter 11 cause.
While the above statistics for Manville Corp. give some idea of
the financial impact involved, we note that Manville is only one of
many defendants involved in asbestos-related disease claims. We also
note that there exist many other causes of occupational disease in
addition to the cause of exposure to asbestos. Some of these causes
have received a great deal of attention in attempting solutions, such
as black lung disease, which precipitated the Black Lung Benefits Act
of 1969. This Act has been amended frequently since that time. Other
causes, such as exposure to Agent Orange, which has received much
recent publicity, have not had special systems fully established for
compensating victims. And indeed many other occupational diseases
abound. The Bureau of Labor Statistics documents approximately
162,000 occupational illnesses each year, a figure which likely
understates the true number.
See Viscusi (1984)
,
p. 54
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Finally, we point out that although this paper is directed pri-
marily towards occupational safety, it also has general implications
for the use of hazardous products in the workplace in general. Workers
frequently file suits against the producers of such hazardous products
as a means of circumventing the limited recompensing of Workers' Com-
pensation insurance. This is possihle even when the manufacturer of
the hazardous product and the employer are one in the same through the
so-calLed "dual capacity" theory.
Transaction Costs
Manvilie Corporation had already paid close to $50 million in
legal fees and court costs from the time its Chapter 11 proceedings
began through the beginning of 1986. However, these costs were paid
in part to set up its present system and a chief goal of its present
system is to reduce costs of future litigation. This is understand-
able when one considers the high transactions costs of compensating
victims through the current svstem. In products liability insurance,
for example, only about 37.5 cents out of every premium dollar goes to
compensate victims. The remainder goes to insurer operating costs and
o
to legal costs. Furthermore, even these costs would underestimate
the costs associated with paying out claims dollars, as they do not
7
The dual capacity theory allows for the injured party to sue the
employer in the latter's capacity as producer of the hazardous product.
Otherwise, the employer would be protected against a suit via Workers'
Compensation laws. See, for example, Williams and Heins (1985).
8
See Viscusi (198A), p. 69; see also Tobias (1982), p. 211.
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include costs such as lost, wages and transportation costs for court
appearances.
Another cost is the cost of unfiled claims. If the compensation
system is somewhat complex, many individuals might feel intimidated hy
it. Perhaps they would experience some disutility in seeking recom-
pense for an occupational injury. For example, someone might prefer
not to testify in court; or they might not appreciate having their
background history researched; or they may wish to simply forget about
some untoward event rather than be forced to recall the details of
their mishap over and over again. While such costs do not show up on
a company's balance sheet, they are nonetheless costs imposed on
society by the frictions within the compensation-seeking mechanisms;
and as such these costs could perhaps be viewed as a type of social
transaction costs.
IV. The Nature of Exposures
Multiple Causes and Sources
If our compensation mechanism for occupational diseases and
injuries is based in part on the contribution of workplace conditions
to the resulting disease or injury, a problem arises as to what that
contribution might be. Much attention has focused on the problem of
determining who ought to pay for occupational disease cases. One of
the major problems is determining the source of exposure. If we were
dealing with a well-defined accident with immediately recognizable
untoward consequences, we could focus on the questions of negligence
(if a negligence tort standard is extant), work relatedness (if a
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Workers' Compensation hearing is involved) and/or the degree of com-
pensation. However, the cause of many occupational diseases is harder
to determine as no accident per se may have occurred. Instead the
exposure might have taken place over a period of time and might have
been from one of a number of different possible sources. As such, it
underscores the distinction between the terms "accident" and "occur-
9
rence" in the language of insurance policies.
The usual problems involved with showing negligence apply if we
seek recourse under a negligence torts standard. Even with a strict
liability theory of torts, many problems are encountered in occupa-
tional disease cases. For example, there might, be numerous noLential
causes of a disease, and indeed it is highlv likely that several of
these potential causes were jointlv responsible for the disease. It
may be impossible, however, to determine which of the potential causes
was actually responsible or to what degree each cause is actually
responsible. In this regard, we might be faced with an reducible
uncertainty.
To complicate matters, we might have not only multiple causes of
the onset of the disease, but also may have multiple sources for each
cause, multiple employers as potential contributors to the onset of
the disease, and perhans the lifestvle of the individual as another
q
The concept of an "occurrence" is broader than that of an
"accident." The key distinction is that the latter is viewed as sud-
den and unintentional. Three Mile Island, for example, was an acci-
dent. However, a worker at another nuclear power plant might feel that
she was exposed to too much radiation over her 10 year employment
tenure. Such exposure would be an "occurrence," although no "accident"
had occurred.
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contributing factor. For example, the smoking of cigarettes is known
to increase the risk of asbestos-related diseases. Some diseases,
such as cancer, and coronary disease could obviously come from a number
of possible on- and off-the-job exposures. There also exists the
possibility that the disease was caused by exposure to several dif-
ferent substances and/or conditions, any one of which would have been
harmless in isolation. How should we apportion financial responsi-
bility in a situation such as this?
The complexity of the problem is compounded by the observation
that multiple causes often do not provide additive contributions. In
many instances the risk from exposure to multiple causes is close to
multiplicative. Smoking, for example, increases the risk of lung
cancer by a factor of 10 in people who are not exposed to asbestos and
19
by the same factor in people exposed to a given level of asbsestos.
Asbestos itself increases the risk of Lung cancer by the same factor
in people of various ages. Tbis characteristic implies that the mar-
ginal contribution of a given exposure depends on all other exposures
and cannot be easily isolated.
!0
See, for example, Beclake (1976).
For example, several deaths are caused each year by someone
using chlorine blench to help clean their toilet. When mixed with
commercial toilet bowl cleaners, the bleach causes a toxic vapor to
form.
12
See, for example, I. J. Selikoff, 'Disability Compensation for
Asbestos-Associated Disease in the United States," Report to the U.S.
Dept. of Labor, Environmental Sciences Laboratory, Mount Sinai School
of Medicine, New York, NY, 1981.
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Given these elements, the way in which financial responsibility
should be apportioned is not clear. The apportionment rules will have
an important bearing on the deterrent value of the system and on the
resulting allocation of resources.
Time Delays
The problems associated with determining the cause of a disease
are exacerbated, in the case of occupational diseases, by long latency
periods and the intertemporal nature of the exposures. Also, new
problems are created by these time lapses. For example, consider a
disease that is not manifested, or at least not diagnosed, untiL 20
years after exposure at a former workplace. The employer responsible
for the exposure may have been out of existence for quite some time.
Its records might no longer be available to establish the liability of
insurers. If financial responsibility is questionable, the passage of
time will cause the case to suffer from deteriorating evidence and
increasing complexity because of subsequent additional exposures.
Furthermore, a statute of limitations that has run out may not allow a
13
suit to be filed.
Determining financial responsibility is complicated still further
when the worker has been exposed to hazards at several different work
sites, which becomes more and more likely with the passage of time.
The problem compounds itself, since even if we were somehow able to
pick out a single place of employment where the exposure took place,
13
See, for example, the papers of Danzon (1984) and Epstein (1984)
for a discussion of these problems in more detail.
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this exposure might have occurred over the course of several years.
As such, there might have been several changes in corporate structure
and many insurers may have provided liability coverage to the employer,
The problem also exists as to how we should apportion financial respon-
sibility among the several insurers. This allocation of financial
responsibility is complicated by the intricate layering of primary and
excess insurers and by the exhaustion of policy limits in specific
years in jurisdictions that hold that liability is joint and several.
Much of the current turmoil in asbestos-related disease, for example,
involves interpreting the language in insurance contracts written many
years earlier.
V. Effective Deterrence
Incentives for Optimal Safetv
Any system of compensation for occupational diseases affects
employer behavior. Much of the literature in law and economics that
addresses the question of liability for occupational diseases empha-
sizes the incentives the system provides for achieving an efficient
14level of safety in the workplace. Ideally, the compensation system
should provide incentives for employers to provide a safe work environ-
ment .
Penalizing firms on the basis of current standards provides a
dubious incentive if the employer's actions were consistent with stan-
dards and norms at the time the exposure occurred. Epstein addresses
14
The concept of "efficiency" in this setting is discussed in part
VII of the current paper.
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this point, noting that, "(I)t is highly unwise to allow suits with
the properties so common in modern tort litigation, in which a jury
determines the standards for safe products while simultaneously deter-
mining whether a given product meets the standards just set." The
obvious problem here is that the standards are set around the circum-
stances involved in the claim which is being decided, so that an ex
ante decision by the employer to comply (or not to comply) with this
set of standards is impossible. A problem which may be even more
serious is that this system of penalties provides a deterrent to the
improvement of standards by employers who may face a large liability
if they establish the likelihood that some practice or exposure
creates a hazard in the workplace.
A related issue deals with the fact that technology is constantly
changing, so that standards that existed at the time exposure to some
occupational disease occurred will, most likelv, be different from the
standards of today. Our concern should be primarily with providing
incentives to meet current standards and to improve those standards
rather than focusing on what could have been done with knowledge that
has developed since the exposure took place. Of course, the penalties
for past violations signal employers as to how strict the system is in
enforcing its standards. These signals help to deter unsatisfactory
performance by employers subject to today's standards.
15
Epstein (1984)
,
p. 491.
Viscusi (1984), p. 76, apparently overlooks this point in
claiming that a penalty on past exposures "will not directly induce
reductions in current risk levels..." Although, Viscusi is correct if
no threat of penalty existed at the time of earlier noncompliance with
standards of that time.
_!9-
Incentives for Claims Filing
There is another side to the incentive issue, namely the incen-
tives provided for the worker to file false or exaggerated claims. Tn
some ways, the tort system and systems of insurance encourage these
claims. Contingent fees, easy access to the courts and the near non-
existence of counter charges for frivolous suits make it easy for
claimants to seek excessive damage awards. Of course, the so-called
"deep pockets" theory of jury decision making cannot he disregarded
here, where jury awards are often partially hased on ahility to com-
pensate. The current system provide an incentive to file late in the
course of the disease (subject to statute of limitation constraints)
since this strategy maximizes hoth the award size if the case is won
and the probability of winning. This might be particularly problematic
for diseases viewed as incurable. This late fiLing could delay the
development of cures, rehabilitation and methods of limiting the further
development of the disease.
We also have the usual types of moral hazard issues that arise in
cases of asymmetric information. A fuLly covered worker might not
take the proper on-the-job precautions, knowing that losses will be
compensated. In addition, there is a moral hazard involved in deter-
mining the facts leading to the onset of the disease. For example,
would the workman who had just been inadvertently exposed to a mi Id
dose of radiation on the job find it in his interest to mention to
his employer that he had been with his girlfriend, who is a nurse,
the night before at a secret rendezvous at the hospital and that they
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secretly met in the X-ray room with the equipment accidently turned
on?
Of course, there might exist disincentives for filing claims
(especially claims that are not too large) if the procedures involved
are expensive, time consuming, tedious or embarrassing. A workman
rendered impotent by a work-related exposure might be reluctant to
seek recourse if it involves explaining to a jury or review panel
(perhaps over and over again) the details of his impairment as well as
defending the countercharge that he is only experiencing personal,
psychological, sexual problems, and facing the possibility that dis-
closure of the condition might affect the quality of his life.
The Role of Information and Insurance
The asymmetry of information creates several problems. On the one
hand, we have the moral hazard problem, where the workers have incen-
tives to file claims that would not be justified based on ful L infor-
mation. But the employer also is in a position to know and withhold
information. The emplovee probably knows only as much informalion as
availahle statistics show and the employer is willing to disclose as
public information. If an employer can reduce future claims by being
"unaware" of certain workplace hazards, it can choose to ignore infor-
mation concerning these hazards so that it can later claim it was
unaware of them.
The fact that both the employer and the employee may have insurance
complicates matters. The employer's insurance may provide incentives
for moral hazard by the employer. For example, regulations or legal
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precedents which raise standards of due care and make it easier to
prove employers did not exercise due care can have the effect of
actual Ly lowering the level of care used and causing a substitution
of increased insurance purchases... hardly the intended effect.
Additionally, the nature of the exposure to hazards which caused
the disease for a particular individual is often uncertain. Questions
arise as to which parties should be held financially responsible. The
employer's behavior ex post of the discovery of a disease might, at
least in part, be directed towards establishing insurer liability. At
the same time, insurers will make an effort to show that they are not
liable. Thus, some resources are directed towards establishing this
potential liability of insurers—resources which could be used more
productively elsewhere.
VI. Appropriate Compensation
Disparity Among Compensations
Unless compensation is decided on a case-by-case basis by an
entity with complete information and ultimate wisdom, we are bound to
have some individuals with similar claims compensated differently.
Asymmetric information precludes complete knowledge so we cannot
expect to compensate all individuals optimally (assuming we know what
"optimal" compensation is). Although this might be minimized if the
system induces all parties involved to truthfuLly reveal their private
information, it cannot be guaranteed that providing such incentives is
17
See Schlesinger (1983).
-22-
consistent with basic efficiency conditions. As a result, one indi-
vidual might receive a million dollar award while a similarly situated
co-worker, whose case is heard by a different jury or review panel,
might have the case dismissed due to insufficient evidence.
The existence of potential disparity may encourage behavior which
is aimed at affecting the compensation system itself rather than
towards more productive uses. For example, a diseased worker may
prefer to forego the optimal level of therapy prior to a hearing in
order to gain sympathy for his or her current state of being. The
asymmetry of information and the adversarial system of review (espe-
cially if it is the courts) provides incentives to all parties to
overstate their respective cases.
Taken to the extreme, the system can suffer in general from two
basic types of errors: (1) compensating undeserving victims (unde-
serving from a standpoint of causation) and (2) not compensating de-
serving victims. Obviously both types of errors are bound to occur.
Moreover, the above description over-simplifies the situation, which
in reality is continuous. Thus, we should talk about over- and under-
compensating various victims, under- and overcharging various poten-
tiallv responsible parties, and the degree to which they are incor-
rectly compensated or incorrectly assessed for injury.
18
A mechanism is said to be incentive compatible if telLing the
truth is a Nash equilibrium (i.e., if all economic agents find their
optimal strategy is telling the truth rather than not telling the
truth). If the mechanism is also to be individually rational, meaning
all economic agents would choose to participate, it cannot guarantee a
Pareto-ef f icient outcome. See Hurwicz (1973).
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Even if we reduce some of the discrepancies by going to scheduled
awards, as suggested by Danzon (1984), we retain the asymmetry of
information and cannot guarantee that using the schedule will elimi-
nate disparity, especially since schedules are finite whereas the set
of possible outcomes forms a continuum. It may also be true that out-
comes very near to each other in this continuum are placed quite far
19
apart on our discrete compensation schedules.
We also have discrepancies which are created by time and space.
For example, Workers' Compensation lump-sum benefits for certain
mishaps exhibit Large differences among the various jurisdictions.
Tn 1981 , the loss of an arm at the shoulder brought a Lump-sum award
of $10,100 in North Dakota, whereas the same iniury brought an award
of $ 142 ,347 in the District of Columbia and an award of $225,507 to
someone who was a federal employee. Workers' Compensation benefits for
other scheduled injuries and permanent totaL disability show simiLar
differences among jurisdictions. The point is that even the use of
scheduied awards does not eLiminate the variance inherent in the system
No Compensation and Multiple Compensation
Even if the level of compensation couid be determined with perfect
information, a f inanciai-responsibi Lity system might be Limited by
19
For example, the precise location of the amputation of a body
limb might need to be classified as to one of several specific loca-
tions, each with quite different scheduled awards. We also might
ignore such disparities which arise from life patterns that develop
years after initial exposure. Consider here the former handler of
radioactive wastes who Later becomes the classical pianist, only to
find his hands have developed cancerous growths due to his use of
defective gloves.
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bankruptcy considerations. Landes and Posner (1984), for example,
show how bankruptcy constraints alter the incentives of employers to
provide a safe workplace. Viscusi (1984) points out how a bankrupt
firm also leaves its former workers who later develop disease con-
ditions with no former employer left to sue. More generally, the
effectiveness of any mechanism that depends upon ex post compensation
from a previous employer needs to consider the employer's abiLity to
pay when required. One needs to realize that such an employer may no
longer exist, either because of an earlier bankruptcy or due to a
myriad of other possible reasons, or if it does exist might not own
20
sufficient resources to pay all claims.
If a former employer is the only source of compensation, we have
just discussed how it is possible that no compensation might be forth-
coming. However, there are quite often multiple sources of compensa-
tion. Some of these may be via public welfare programs, some via
insurance policies, some via torts awards, and still others via impli-
cit contracts such as premiums for risk that might be built into the
wage structure.
Public welfare programs usual Ly provide assistance to the diseased
21individual without regards to the cause. For example, public medi-
cal assistance and/or assistance from private foundations directed
towards particular diseases might provide medical and therapeutic care
20
*Another possibilitv is that a former employer has merged with or
been acquired by another firm, in which case questions of liability
for the new firm arise. This issue is not considered in our paper.
21
However, some of the programs depend on the worker's wealth
status and some programs are geared towards specific diseases.
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and advice for no or nominal charges. Social Security Disability
Insurance (SSDI), .iedicare and Medicaid, for example, do not concern
themselves with fault in allocating benefits. In addition to this
public assistance, many employers provide private medical and/or dis-
ability insurance coverages to their employees. Furthermore, employees
may opt to purchase additional insurance cover on a private basis.
Some workers might also have disability provisions within their pri-
vate pension plans. Additionally, some workers may have coverage
through accidental death and dismemberment insurance (ADD), which pro-
vides lump-sum scheduled benefits, or through dismemberment provisions
in their life insurance policies.
These benefits, along with those that are (at least in theory)
related to the cause of the disease, such as Workers' Compensation
insurance and tort awards, interact with each other in various ways.
For example, successful tort actions enable the employer to recover
(through various legal mechanisms) any Workers' Compensation payments.
However, SSDI benefits are not recoverable in this way; and ADD bene-
fits are paid regardless of other compensation. Thus, it is possible
tor injured workers to receive non-offsetting awards from different
sources. The total of aLl awards might leave the individual finan-
cially better off following the disease than had the disease not
occurred. This possible overcompensation will be exacerbated if the
predisease wage level already included a premium for bearing job-
related risks. Thus, the worker might end up being compensated both
22
ex ante (through this risk premium) as well as ex post.
22
See Viscusi (1983).
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VII. Issues in the Design of Efficient Compensation
Basic Considerations of Efficiency
In theory, we desire a compensation system for occupational
disease that equates the marginal benefits and marginal costs of the
induced level of safety in the workplace. The usual problems asso-
ciated with measuring costs and benefits apply in the area of occupa-
tional disease
—
perhaps to an even greater extent than usual. We are
also confronted with problems associated with asymmetric information
as discussed previously. Even if we could somehow circumvent these
informational and measurement problems, we are still at an impasse in
defining a collective set of value judgements for society, as is clear
from the weiL-known results of Arrow (1951).
Given the above types of limitations, a more workable criterion is
that developed by Danzon. She defines efficiency as the "minimization
of costs from four sources: injuries, injury prevention, risk bearing,
23
and the overhead cost of litigation and administration. We suggest
that another source of costs, namely inappropriate compensation, be
added to those above. These costs are incurred whenever the compen-
sation paid is different from the loss incurred. The inclusion of
these costs is essential if we are to decide the level of protection
against insolvency that is needed or to include in our analysis the
costs of litigation and administration.
The costs of "injuries and injury prevention"—better referred to
as "diseases and disease prevention" in our model—are straightforward
23
Danzon (1984), p. 518.
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frora a conceptual point of view, although it might be difficult in any
specific case to measure these costs. The tradeoffs between disease
costs and disease prevention costs is the focal point of incentives
designed to provide an appropriate level of workplace safety.
We consider the cost of risk bearing to be the costs of uncertainty
that are irreducible within the system of employers, employees and
insurers. Ideally, it could be measured as the irreducible disutility
associated with the uncertainty. Since aggregate wealth within the
system is lower in states of the world in which diseases occur, we
cannot fully insure all agents within the system as pointed out by
Hirschleifer and Riley (1979). We view this as the cost of risk
bearing. Quite apart from these risk-bearing costs, the cost of
inappropriate compensation is viewed as the cost of misallocating con-
tingent claims within the system. For example, if a risk-averse worker
could be made just as well off (i.e., kept at the same level of ex-
pected utility) with a set of contingent claims that provided a lower
expected wealth, the original set of claims can be viewed as too
expensive and consequently inefficient.
Assigning Liability
Even with complete information, we cannot circumvent the many
problems associated with the compensating of occupational disease vic-
tims, although better information would at least help to lessen some
24
This argument implicitly assumes that some economic agent, e.g.,
the insurer, is risk neutral. Thus, the difference in expected wealth
could be transferred to the risk-neutral agent to achieve a Pareto
improvement.
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of these problems. For example, if the source of exposure to occupa-
tional disease is clearly identifiable, perfect information about the
probability of occurrence could be used to calculate compensating
wage-risk premiums which in turn could be used to purchase insurance
against untoward effects of the disease. If the sources of exposure
are multiple, we can still assign a pro-rated liability with perfect
information if the probability of occurrence is additive in the proba-
bilities attributed to the potential sources. If the probability is
not additive, the assignment of liability and/or financial responsibil-
ity among the various potential exposure sources is not so clear-cut.
For example, if asbestos increases the risk of cancer five-fold and
tobacco increases it ten-fold, but tobacco and asbestos taken together
increase the risk of cancer one hundred-fold, how should we pro rate
the liability? Or, if three years of exposure to a particular work-
place condition is considered perfectly safe, but 15 vears is con-
sidered extraordinarily dangerous, how should we assign liabiLity for
a diseased worker who has worked three years for each of five em-
ployers? Thus, we see that risk might be nonadditive across sources
of exposure as well as nonadditive over time.
Epstein (1984) suggests that we assign liability in the second
case to the last employer of the individual. Clearly this suggestion
is aimed at reducing some of the costs of litigation and administra-
tion. If being the "last" in a chain of employers is random, there
would not be any unfair long-run biases against a particular employer.
In a sense, this is a risk-pooling scheme designed to minimize trans-
action costs. Unfortunately, such a scheme has adverse effects on
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various markets. For example, workers with a history of exposure
would not be hired by new employers who would rather hire inex-
perienced workers with no history of exposure. The lower skill levels
of such inexperienced workers affects productive efficiency as well as
affecting labor mobility.
If we wish to apportion the liability for occupational disease,
the nonadditivity of effects from multiple sources is problematic. If
we can determine the marginal risk introduced by a particular work
environment, this would be the appropriate value to use in assigning a
pro-rated liability. However, such a marginal contribution depends
upon the risks already present and is thus sensitive to the order in
which we "add up" the total risk. This marginal addition to risk is
sensitive to personal characteristics of the worker as well as sen-
sitive to the timing of its addition. We would not expect resulting
wage risk premiums to be paid according to each individual worker's
personal characteristics, but rather to set an efficient wage risk
premium within the market and allow workers to self-select their place
of employment. Only workers whose personal marginal valuation of
additional job-related risk was below the market-based wage risk pre-
mium would accept employment. If a particular exposure becomes more
dangerous with a longer exposure, for example, we would expect some
workers to change jobs as their marginal risk valuation surpasses the
wage risk premium over time.
If information concerning the marginal probabilities of contracting
the disease from a particular exposure is used to create specific wage
risk premiums, the proper incentives for workplace safety will be
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instilled as is shovm by Landes and Posner (1984). Landes and Posner
suggest that we compensate workers who are exposed to hazards by
paying them ex ante for the expected value of their future losses,
which is essentially the same as paying a wage risk premium. The risk
premium is based on the additional risks faced at a particular work-
place. Of course, workers who never contract the disease will be com-
pensated anyway and workers who do contract the disease from the work-
place exposure are not paid full damages. There are also workers who
will develop the disease from sources not contained in the workplace.
However, we cannot know for certain which workers would have developed
the disease without the workplace exposure; and our ex ante liability
rule based on marginal probability changes can be shown to be ex post
25
efficient to the extent that probabilities are correctly estimated.
VII L. Concluding Remarks
Unfortunately, there is no criteria of optimality that can be
generally applied when evaluating financial responsibility for occupa-
tional disease. Pareto efficiency cannot be expected and alternative
models must be considered within a second-best framework. Our evalua-
tion criteria, which are an extension of Danzon's, consider the social
costs arising from five sources: injuries, injury prevention, risk
bearing, overhead costs of litigation and administration, and inappro-
priate compensation. The incentives provided within any compensatory
system play a major role in achieving (or at least striving towards) a
minimization of these costs.
25
See Landes and Posner (1984).
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Asymmetry of information is of key consequence in facilitating
effective compensation schemes. Incentives to reveal privately held
information on the part of both employers and employees are, unfortu-
nately, lacking. Employer-specific information concerning the par-
ticulars of workplace hazards and employee-specific information
regarding exposure to contributing factors outside the workplace could
be used in conjunction with each other to develop defenses against the
occurrence of occupational disease. Both parties might be better off
if they were to reveal their private information. However, each has
an incentive to conceal private information, regardless of the other's
revelation strategy, thus creating a "prisoner ' s-dilemma" type of
situation.
If wage differentials exist to the extent that workers in riskier
occupations receive a higher wage to compensate for the extra risk,
these differentials could provide a perfect ex ante compensation (if
information about the risk is available). If workers are further com-
pensated after the extra risk manifests itself via the onset of an
occupational disease, we would apparently have a "double dipping" into
the employer's pockets by the diseased worker. An alternative view is
that ex post compensation is less than complete. In this view, wage
differentials compensate workers ex ante only for the difference be-
tween what they would receive with complete ex post compensation and
what they can actually expect to receive ex post. If workers expect a
more complete ex post compensation for occupational disease, they will
require a lower compensating wage differential for a given level of
risk.
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A compensation mechanism for occupational disease must work well
within the bounds placed upon it by imperfect information and limited
resources. This paper considers the design of such a mechanisms,
paying particular attention to satisfying both ex ante and ex post
criterions of efficiency. Compensation systems that are ex ante
efficient—thus providing proper incentives for all economic agents to
take efficient actions—cannot be deemed totally satisfactory when the
system has the possibility of bankrupting itself or when ex post com-
pensations are not correlated with damages incurred. Thus, ex post
considerations must also be examined. We defined these ex post cri-
teria and showed how much of the existing literature has not attempted
to address these issues. We see no easy answers to some of the hard
issues remaining; but at least we have a framework established that
allows us to strive towards establishing an effective system of com-
pensation.
-33-
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